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Abstract
We present a dynamical theory of a multi-agent mar-
ket game, the so-called Minority Game (MG), based
on crowds and anticrowds. The time-averaged ver-
sion of the dynamical equations provides a quantita-
tively accurate, yet intuitively simple, explanation for
the variation of the standard deviation (‘volatility’)
in MG-like games. We demonstrate this for the ba-
sic MG, and the MG with stochastic strategies. The
time-dependent equations themselves reproduce the
essential dynamics of the MG.
Agent-based games have great potential applica-
tion in the study of fluctuations in financial markets.
Challet and Zhang’s Minority Game (MG) [1, 2] of-
fers possibly the simplest example and has been the
subject of much research [2]. The MG comprises an
odd number of agentsN choosing repeatedly between
option 0 (e.g. buy) and option 1 (e.g. sell). The
winners are those in the minority group, e.g. sellers
win if there is an excess of buyers. The outcome at
each timestep represents the winning decision, 0 or
1. A common bit-string of the m most recent out-
comes is made available to the agents at each time-
step [3]. The agents randomly pick s strategies at
the beginning of the game, with repetitions allowed -
each strategy is a bit-string of length 2m which pre-
dicts the next outcome for each of the 2m possible
histories. Agents reward successful strategies with
a (virtual) point. At each turn of the basic MG,
the agent uses her most successful strategy, i.e. the
one with the most virtual points. Here we develop
a dynamical theory for MG-like games based on the
formation of crowds and anticrowds.
The number of agents holding a particular combi-
nation of strategies can be written as a D ×D × . . .
(s terms) dimensional matrix Ω, where D is the total
number of available strategies. For s = 2, this is sim-
ply a D ×D matrix where the entry (i, j) represents
the number of agents who picked strategy i and then
j. The strategy labels are given by the decimal repre-
sentation of the strategy plus unity, for example the
strategy 0101 for m = 2 has strategy label 5+1=6. Ω
is fixed at the beginning of the game (‘quenched disor-
der’) and can represent either the full strategy space
or the reduced strategy space [1], depending on the
choice of D. Σ is another time-independent matrix,
containing all the strategies in the required space in
their binary form: Σr,h+1 describes the prediction of
strategy r given the history h (where h is the decimal
corresponding to the m-bit binary history string).
We introduce a vector n(t): this contains the num-
ber of agents using each strategy at time t, in order
of increasing strategy label. The vector S(t) contains
the virtual score for each strategy at time t in order
of increasing strategy label. The vector R(t) lists the
strategy label in order of best-to-worst virtual points
score at time t; if any strategies are tied in points
then the strategy with the lower-value label is listed
first. The vector ρ(t) shows the rank of the strategy
listed in order of increasing strategy label at time t.
Hence R(t) and ρ(t) can be found from S(t) using
simple sort operations. The vector n(t) is the sum of
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two terms
n(t) = n0(t) + nd(t) . (1)
Here n0(t) gives the number of agents using each
strategy; however where any strategies are tied in vir-
tual score, n0(t) assumes that the agent will use the
strategy with the lower-value label by virtue of the
definition of R(t). The term nd(t) accounts for tied
strategies, and hence provides a correction to n0(t).
n0(t) is given by
n0(t)r =
2m+1∑
i=ρ(t)r
[ ̥̂ (Ω)]r,R(t)i (2)
where [ ̥̂ (Ω)]α,β = Ωα,β+Ωβ,α−δα,βΩα,β . The vector
nd(t) is given by
nd(t)r =
∑
r′ 6=r
δs(t)
r′
,s(t)rSgn(r
′ − r)Binr′,r (3)
where: Binr′,r ∼ B[( ̥̂ (Ω))r′,r, 12 ] and Binr′,r =
Binr,r′. The standard notation Bin represents the
binary distribution. Note the condition Binr′,r =
Binr,r′ which guarantees conservation of agents, as
in the basic MG. The outcome parameter Υ(t) de-
notes which choice, 0 or 1, is the minority (and hence
winning) decision at time t:
Υ(t) = H[−[n(t)TΣ′]h(t)+1] (4)
where Σ′ = 2Σ − 1. The history, i.e. bit-string of
the m most recent outcomes, and the virtual scores
of the strategies are updated as follows:
h(t+ 1) = 2[h(t)− 2m−1H[h(t)− 2m−1]] + Υ(t)
(5)
where H is the Heaviside function, and
S(t+ 1) = S(t) + Σ′h(t)+1[2Υ(t)− 1] . (6)
Equations (1-6) are a set of time-dependent equations
which reproduce the essential dynamics of the basic
MG, and can be easily extended to describe MG gen-
eralizations. Iterating these equations is equivalent to
running a numerical simulation, but is far easier and
can even be done analytically. A slight difference may
arise as a result of the method chosen for tie-breaking
between strategies with equal virtual points: a nu-
merical program will typically break this tie using
a separate coin-toss for each agent, whereas the dy-
namical equations group together those agents using
the same pair of strategies and then assign a propor-
tion of that group to a particular strategy using a
coin-toss. This difference is typically unimportant.
As an example of the implementation of these
equations, consider a time te during the following
game: m = 2, s = 2 and N = 101 in the reduced
strategy space, with a strategy configuration Ω and
strategy score given as follows:
Ω =


2 3 2 3 5 3 1 1
1 3 2 2 2 1 2 1
1 0 2 0 1 3 1 3
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 3
4 5 1 1 2 0 0 0
2 1 2 1 0 2 0 4
1 2 1 2 0 0 2 4
1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2


S(te) =


3
−1
−3
1
−1
3
1
−3


, with Σ =


0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1


.
Using these values for Ω and S(te) we can obtain
values for n(t) and ultimately S(te +1). Ω and S(te)
imply that
n0(te) =


31
15
7
13
5
15
13
2


, and nd(te) =


−3
−2
−5
0
2
3
0
5


with probability 10565536 , yielding n(te) when summed.
(When two strategies are tied, agents holding these
strategies each flip a coin to decide which strategy to
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use. The separate probabilities for all tied strategies,
when multiplied together, yield the probability of the
current nd(t) being chosen.)
Suppose h(te) = 2, i.e. the last two minority
groups were ’1’ then ’0’. Hence Υ(te) = 0, h(te+1) =
0 and consequently
S(te + 1) =


4
−2
−2
0
0
2
2
−4


.
An expression for the time-averaged quantity
called the ‘volatility’ (standard deviation of the num-
ber of agents choosing one particular group) can be
easily found using the above formalism:
σMG =
[
t2∑
t=t1
[
ε(t)− ε
]2] 1
2
t2 − t1 (7)
where ε(t) = [n(t)TΣ]h(t)+1 and ε is the time-average
of ε(t) from time t1 to t2. Here t1 and t2 denote the
time window over which the volatility is calculated.
In the reduced strategy space [1] a similar quantity to
this standard deviation can also be written down us-
ing our previously introduced (time-averaged) crowd-
anticrowd framework [4]:
σCA =
t2∑
t=t1
[
1
4
2m∑
r=1
[n(t)r − n(t)2m+1+1−r]2
] 1
2
t2 − t1 . (8)
For a given run of the game σMG 6= σCA, how-
ever these quantities become quantitatively the same
(within the limits of sample size) when averaged over
initial configurations of strategies[4]. σCA mirrors the
semi-analytic approach introduced to motivate the
time-independent crowd-anticrowd theory of Ref. [4]
(see Fig. 1 of Ref. [4]). Indeed, the dynamical equa-
tions can be linked more formally with our previous
time-averaged approach[4]. Consider, for example,
the situation where no two strategies are tied in vir-
tual points and there are an equal number of agents
having each possible pairing of strategies (lowm limit
and reduced strategy space), i.e. all elements in Ω
are equal and non-zero. It is then easy to show that
n0(t)r reduces to n
0
r =
N
(2m+1)2 [1+ 2(2
m+1− ρ(t)r)];
this is precisely the vector of the quantity nr intro-
duced in Ref. [4] now written in order of increasing
strategy label. If we allow for tied strategies, nd(t)
will be non-zero thus reducing the size of large crowds
and increasing the size of the smaller crowds (and
hence anticrowds), thereby leading to a smaller stan-
dard deviation.
We now turn to a comparison between the standard
deviation or ‘volatility’ σ obtained from numerical
simulations and our (time-averaged) crowd-anticrowd
theory. We start with the basic MG. Figure 1 shows
the spread of numerical values for different numerical
runs (open circles), the full crowd-anticrowd theoret-
ical calculation (large solid circles) and various limit-
ing analytic curves (solid lines) for which closed-form
expressions were given in Ref. [4]. Fuller details are
provided in Ref. [4]. The time-averaged dynamics
can be described using a quantity P (r′ = r¯) which
represents the probability that any strategy r′ is the
anti-correlated partner of strategy r [4]. To produce
the limiting analytic curves in Fig. 1, P (r′ = r¯) is
taken to be either a delta-function or a flat distri-
bution. The full theory takes the relevant form of
P (r′ = r¯) from the game. The agreement is very
good, confirming that our theory captures the essen-
tial physics.
In a variant of the basic MG, agents pick which
strategy to use stochastically at each timestep. Fo-
cussing on s = 2, numerical simulations [5] found
that the larger-than-random σ in the ‘crowded’
regime (i.e. small m) becomes smaller-than-random
when the strategy-picking rule is made increasingly
stochastic. Our crowd-anticrowd theory provides a
quantitative explanation of this effect. Let θ be the
probability that the agent uses the worst of her s = 2
strategies. Figure 2 shows a comparison between nu-
merical simulation (open circles) and analytic expres-
sions (monotonically-decreasing solid lines) obtained
using our crowd-anticrowd theory (full details are
given in Ref. [6]). These analytic expressions vary
in their choice of P (r′ = r¯): the upper line σdelta in
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Fig. 2 assumes a delta function while the lower line
σflat assumes a flat distribution. The theory agrees
well in the range θ = 0→ 0.35 and provides a quan-
titative, yet physically intuitive, explanation for the
previously unexplained transition in σ from larger-
than-random to smaller-than-random as θ increases.
Above θ = 0.35, the numerical data tend to flatten
off while the analytic expressions predict a decrease
in σ as θ → 0.5. This is because the analytic the-
ory averages out the fluctuations in strategy-use at
each time-step. In Ref. [6] we showed how to cor-
rect this shortcoming of the analytic theory. Con-
sider θ = 0.5; Fig. 2 inset (a) shows the measured
numerical distribution in σ for θ = 0.5, while inset
(b) shows the result from the semi-analytic procedure
introduced in Ref. [6]. The two distributions are in
good agreement. Note that the non-zero average (4.7
for N = 101,m = 2 and s = 2) for each distribution
lies below the random coin-toss limit
√
N/2. It is also
possible to perform a fully analytic calculation of the
average σθ in the θ → 0.5 limit [6]; this value (which
is also 4.7 for N = 101,m = 2 and s = 2) is shown in
Fig. 2.
In summary, we have demonstrated that the crowd-
anticrowd approach can be applied to explain many
aspects of MG games, yielding both time-averaged
and time-dependent theories (see also Ref. [7]). Our
efforts to develop such simplified market games in
order to describe real-world financial markets are de-
scribed elsewhere [8].
We thank A. Short for useful discussions.
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FIG. 1. Theoretical crowd-anticrowd calculation
(solid circles) and numerical simulations (open cir-
cles) for the standard deviation σ in basic MG with
s = 2 and N = 101. 16 numerical runs are shown for
eachm. Solid lines correspond to analytic expressions
representing special cases witihin the time-averaged
crowd-anticrowd theory of Ref. [4].
FIG. 2. Theoretical crowd-anticrowd calculation
and numerical simulations (circles) for σ vs. the
probability parameter θ in the stochastic MG. Here
N = 101,m = 2 and s = 2. Monotonically decreasing
solid lines correspond to analytic expressions σdelta
and σflat (see text). Dashed line shows random coin-
toss value. Solid arrow indicates theoretical value
σθ→0.5 = 4.7 for θ → 0.5. Inset shows distribution of
σ values at θ = 0.5 for several thousand randomly-
chosen initial strategy configurations: (a) numerical
simulation, (b) semi-analytic theory of Ref. [6].
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